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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

Appellant, Lillian Hatheway (Ms. Hatheway), appeals the district court's dismissal, on
summary judgment, of all of her claims against Respondents, Board of Regents of the University
of Idaho and University of Idaho (U of I). Ms. Hatheway worked at U of I from 1999 to 2008 as
an administrative assistant. She resigned from U of I on August 28, 2008. Ms. Hatheway then
sued U of I for age discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, constructive discharge
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Ms. Hatheway appeals the Judgment dismissing
her claims entered on December 15, 2011 (R. Vol. III, pp. 689 - 690), pursuant to the district
court's Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dated November 10,
2011. (R. Vol. III, pp. 669 - 688.)
B.

Course of Proceedings

On October 22, 2008, Ms. Hatheway filed suit against the Board of Regents of the
University of Idaho and the University of Idaho, alleging four causes of action:

(1) Age

discrimination and hostile work environment under the IHRA; (2) unlawful retaliation under the
IHRA; (3) constructive discharge; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress.
On August 18, 2011, U of I filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all
of Ms. Hatheway'S claims. In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the district court
considered all materials submitted by the parties including supporting briefs and oral argument.
The district court also considered the applicable standard for summary judgment, both generally
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and in employment discrimination cases. The district court held as follows concerning Ms.
Hatheway's claims:
Age Discrimination Claim
[T]he Court must consider the third element of an age discrimination claim,
which requires a showing by Plaintiff that she was discharged or was
subjected to adverse decisions by her employer and, but for her age, the
discharge or adverse decisions would not have occurred. Defendants
contend this element has not been met and is dispositive of her claim. The
Court agrees.
(R. Vol. III, p. 679)
Plaintiff Hatheway has failed to demonstrate she was constructively
discharged or received disparate treatment.
(R. Vol. III, p. 681)
[T]he Court is unable to find that a reasonable trier of fact could find she
was driven from the workplace or that her age played any role in her
performance evaluations.
(R. Vol. III, p. 682)
Ms. Hatheway has simply failed to demonstrate that age was a factor
driving Dr. Olsson's actions as required in order to establish a prima facie
claim for age discrimination.
(R. Vol. III, p. 683)
Hostile Work Environment Claim
Ms. Hatheway has failed to demonstrate that she was subjected to age
discrimination and, therefore, has failed to demonstrate that her workplace
was permeated with discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe
or pervasive as to alter the conditions of her employment.
The Court, after considering the record as a whole, is unable to find either
subjectively or objectively that a hostile work environment was created as a
result of age discrimination.
(R. Vol. III, p. 684)
-3

Unlawful Retaliation Claim
[T]here is no evidence that the University retaliated against her because she
engaged in protected activities.
(R. Vol. III, p. 685)
Constructive Discharge Claim
Ms. Hatheway has failed to demonstrate she was the subject of age
discrimination. The absence of such a showing is fatal to her claim for
constructive discharged (sic) based on age discrimination.
(R. Vol. III, p. 686)
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Ms. Hatheway has failed to demonstrate the Defendants breached a duty
owed to her. There being no breach of duty shown, Ms. Hatheway's claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress thereby fails.
(R. Vol. III, p. 686)

C.

Statement of Facts
1.

Background and English Department Staff.

a.

On or about November 29, 1999, Ms. Hatheway was hired by U of! as an

Administrative Assistant II (AAII) for the Dean's Office. Ms. Hatheway continued to work in
that capacity through September 9,2002, when she laterally transferred to the English Department,
where she continued to work as an AAII under the supervision and administration of David
Barber, the Chair of the Department at that time. (R. Vol. I, pp. 109 - 110, Depo of Lillian

Hatheway, p. 14, 11. 4 - 11 and p. 35, 1. 23 - p. 37,1. 8.)1

I Specific pages and lines to deposition transcripts are provided for ease of reference in addition to the required format
for citation to the record.
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b.

In approximately July of 2005, Dr. Kurt Olsson (Dr. Olsson) took over the

position of Chair for the Department and he became Ms. Hatheway's direct supervisor. (R. Vol. I,
pp. 151 - 152,

~

7.) During that time, support personnel for the Department consisted of an AAII

position, which was filled by Ms. Hatheway, and a Financial Technician (FT) position. (Id.)
c.

Not long after Dr. Olsson took over the position of Chair, the FT position

for the Department became vacant and a four person search committee, which included both Dr.
Olsson and Ms. Hatheway, was formed to hire a replacement. (R. Vol. I, p. 152,

~

8.) The four

person search committee, including Ms. Hatheway, supported the decision to hire Deborah Allen
(Ms. Allen) into the FT position. (R. Vol. I, p. 111, Depo ofLillian Hatheway, p. 44, 1. 15 - p. 45,
1. 4; and R. Vol. I, p. 152,
d.

~

9.)

After the search committee unanimously decided to offer Ms. Allen the FT

position, Dr. Olsson began negotiations to make Ms. Allen a competitive salary offer based upon
Ms. Allen's knowledge and experience, market forces, and the Department's needs. Ms. Allen
accepted the offer on September 9,2005, beginning her first day in the Department on September
13,2005. (R. Vol. I, p. 152,

~

9; R. Vol. I, p. 98,

~

3.) Dr. Olsson's decision to offer Ms. Allen a

competitive salary was taken for legitimate non-discriminatory reasons and without regard for the
ages of either Ms. Hatheway or Ms. Allen. Instead, Dr. Olsson's decision was based upon the
Department's need for a knowledgeable and experienced applicant who was willing to take the
position at a salary commensurate with what Ms. Allen had been making in her prior
non-supervisory position in the U of I. (R. Vol. I, pp. 152 - 153,
e.

~

10; R. Vol. I, p. 98, Jd.)

Almost immediately upon the hiring of Ms. Allen, Ms. Hatheway came to

Dr. Olsson and made it clear that she was angry that he had offered a larger salary to Ms. Allen
-5

than what had been posted in the job announcement, and that Ms. Allen was making a higher wage
than Ms. Hatheway. Dr. Olsson spoke with Ms. Hatheway in an attempt to explain his reasoning
for making such a decision. During their discussion, Ms. Hatheway stated she viewed this as
being "ethically" unfair and she felt she had a right to be paid at the same rate as Ms. Allen. (R.
Vol. I, p. 153,

~~

12 and 13; R. Vol. I, pp. 111

112, Depo ofLillian Hatheway, p. 42,1. 25 - p. 43,

1. 20 and p. 47, 1. 2 - p. 48, 1. 9.) Despite Dr. Olsson's attempt to explain to Ms. Hatheway that Ms.
Allen had worked in the Office of Sponsored Programs in a supervisory capacity and that Ms.
Allen would be taking a pay cut by accepting the FT position, Ms. Hatheway refused to accept the
fact that such negotiations are a standard practice in a professional field.

CR. Vol. I, p.

153,

~

12.)

Ms. Hatheway told Dr. Olsson that she felt that because it was Ms. Allen's decision to move into a
lower paying position, that Ms. Allen should have taken the amount that was offered in the job
announcement.

CR.

Vol. I, pp. 111

112, Depo of Lillian Hatheway, p. 45, 1. 5 - p. 46, 1. 13.)

Ms. Hatheway further testified that, if she had been reimbursed at an equal rate of pay as Ms.
Allen, she would have been satisfied and would have felt that the issue had been resolved.

CR.

Vol. I, p. 111, Depo of Lillian Hatheway, p. 42, 1. 25 - p. 43, 1. 20.) Ms. Hatheway also admitted
that the problem started for her when Ms. Allen was hired and was paid a wage higher than the
wage that Ms. Hatheway was making.

CR.

Vol. I, p. 112, Depo of Lillian Hatheway, p. 48, 11.

10-18.)
f.

Not long after his discussion with Ms. Hatheway regarding Ms. Allen's

salary, Dr. Olsson returned from a business trip to discover that while he was away, Ms. Hatheway
had been making disparaging remarks to other employees about himself and Ms. Allen.

CR. Vol.

I, p. 153, ~ 13.) Dr. Olsson told Ms. Hatheway very clearly that if she had issues with himself or
-6

Ms. Allen, Ms. Hatheway should speak directly to him, as complaining to other members of the
Department served no useful purpose, was counterproductive behavior, and damaged the
Department. Dr. Olsson also told Ms. Hatheway that such behavior was unacceptable and would
not be tolerated. (ld.)
g.

In the months following the above-described meeting between Dr. Olsson

and Ms. Hatheway, Dr. Olsson heard nothing further from Ms. Hatheway, nor any other member
of the Department, so he assumed they had moved beyond their differences and that Ms. Hatheway
would come directly to him with any issues that concerned her. Acting under this assumption and
in spite of Ms. Hatheway's lapse in professional conduct as described above, Dr. Olsson prepared a
very positive 2005 annual Performance Evaluation for Ms. Hatheway, based in part upon Ms.
Hatheway's job performance during that time in which she was under his direct supervision, and
based in part upon the prior Chair's observations of Ms. Hatheway's work performance under his
supervision during the first half of2005. (R. Vol. I, p. 154,
h.

~

14.)

As the Department moved into 2006, Dr. Olsson was dismayed to learn that

Ms. Hatheway's counterproductive behavior was not only recurring, but that said behavior was
forming an increasingly serious pattern as Ms. Hatheway continued to voice her complaints and
dislike of Ms. Allen and Dr. Olsson to others within the Department. (R. Vol. I, p. 154,

~

15.)

Ms. Allen, a very task-oriented professional, is not given to small talk when there was work to be
done, and Dr. Olsson believes Ms. Hatheway perceived Ms. Allen's reticence to indulge in idle
chit-chat as unfriendliness. Despite Dr. Olsson's efforts to effect change in a positive manner,
rather than confrontationally, things got worse and there appeared to be occasions when Ms.
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Hatheway would suddenly react negatively and upsettingly, and she seemed to be out of control.
(/d.)
1.

Ms. Allen reported her unpleasant encounters with Ms. Hatheway to Dr.

Olsson, and she brought her concerns to the U of I's Human Resources (HR) Department. (R.
Vol. I, p. 100,

~

6.) Toward the end of 2006, Dr. Olsson felt that any intervention on his part

between Ms. Allen and Ms. Hatheway would further jeopardize the Department and make
relationships even more tense, so he went to April Preston (Ms. Preston) in U of I's Human
Resources Department (HR) to seek her guidance and counsel.

Ms. Preston reinforced the

importance of procedure in arriving at a solution, and helped Dr. Olsson to understand his options.
Dr. Olsson felt the need to issue to Ms. Hatheway a clear statement that Ms. Hatheway'S overall
performance, specifically in the area of professional conduct, needed to improve, and that Ms.
Hatheway'S counterproductive behavior needed to end. (R. Vol. I, p. 155, ~ 17.)

J.

Before Dr. Olsson had the opportunity to prepare Ms. Hatheway'S 2006

Performance Evaluation, by January of2007, Ms. Allen had reached the point where she felt it best
that she resign. Although Ms. Allen liked the job and the faculty members, her interactions with
Ms. Hatheway had become very difficult to tolerate. (R. Vol. I, p. 155,
~

~

18; and R. Vol. I, p. 100,

7.) Ms. Allen handed in her resignation to Dr. Olsson on January 29,2007, effective February

16,2007. Just two days after Ms. Allen handed in her resignation, Ms. Hatheway sent Dr. Olsson
an email suggesting that she was interested in Ms. Allen's position. (Id.)
k.

When other Department members learned of Ms. Allen's resignation, there

was an outpouring of support for her from the Department faculty members who were dismayed to
learn that Ms. Allen had decided to resign. (R. Vol. I, p. 155,
-8

~

19.) After receiving such a

strong show of support from Dr. Olsson and other faculty members, Ms. Allen withdrew her
resignation on February 4,2007, much to the delight of many Department members. CR. Vol. I, p.
100,

~

7; R. Vol. I, p. 156,
1.

~

20.)

Ms. Hatheway was not pleased that Ms. Allen had withdrawn her

resignation, and she made her displeasure known within the Department. On February 7, 2007,
she went to the office of one of the senior faculty members in the Department, Douglas Adams,
and complained about Ms. Allen and Dr. Olsson. CR. Vol. I, p. 156, ~ 21; R. Vol. I, p. 196.)
2.

Ms. Hatheway's 2006 Performance Evaluation and Professional
Development Plan.

m.

After further consultation with HR, Dr. Olsson felt that it was imperative

that Ms. Hatheway be given an honest, forwarding-looking and balanced appraisal of her conduct
in her 2006 Performance Evaluation, coupled with a Performance Development Plan ("PDP"),
which was geared toward helping Ms. Hatheway ensure success in her job. In preparing the 2006
Performance Evaluation, Dr. Olsson gave Ms. Hatheway an overall rating of "Needs
Improvement."

He noted that Plaintiff needed to improve in some areas, including civility,

communication and teamwork. The 2006 Performance Evaluation and PDP were hand delivered
to Ms. Hatheway on March 6,2007, by Dr. Olsson.
Vol. I, pp. 197

CR. Vol. I, pp. 156

157,

~~

22 and 23; R.

204.)
n.

On March 7, 2007, Dr. Olsson asked the Director of Administration and

Fiscal Operations, Suzanne Aaron, to meet with Ms. Hatheway and himself to discuss Ms.
Hatheway'S 2006 Performance Evaluation and PDP.

Ms. Hatheway objected to having Ms.

Aaron join their discussion, so Ms. Hatheway and Dr. Olsson met alone in his office. The
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outcome of that meeting was completely unproductive, as any attempt to discuss the documents in
a professional manner was thwarted by Ms. Hatheway's vehement and forceful refusal to accept
any criticism concerning her job performance. In addition, Ms. Hatheway refused to sign either
document.

(R. Vol. I,p. 157,
o.

~24.)

During the March 7, 2007, meeting to discuss the PDP and Performance

Evaluation, Ms. Hatheway brought up for the very first time any mention of retirement and/or what
she perceived as alleged age discrimination.

When Ms. Hatheway made the retirement/age

discrimination remark, the comment was not related to anything else that had been under
discussion - Ms. Hatheway just stated, "I'm thinking that this may have something to do with my
age," and Dr. Olsson responded, "Absolutely not!" Ms. Hatheway asked that Dr. Olsson change
the overall rating on her Performance Evaluation from "Needs Improvement" to "Outstanding"
and, when he refused to do so, she stated she was done talking because they weren't even close to
solving anything due to Dr. Olsson's refusal to change Ms. Hatheway's Performance Evaluation.
(R. Vol. I, p. 157 - 158, ~ 25.)
p.

Age was not a factor in any of the evaluations Dr. Olsson prepared for Ms.

Hatheway. In fact, Dr. Olsson and Ms. Hatheway are close in age. CR. Vol. I, p. 160,
q.
action.

~

32.)

Ms. Hatheway was concerned that the PDP was some kind of disciplinary

However, it was explained to her by Ms. Preston from HR that "performance

development plans are intended to be proactive and supportive documents for the employee.
They are not disciplinary in any way" and that, "The use of a PDP illustrates a commitment on the
part of the supervisor to help the employee be successful." CR. Vol. I, p. 158, ~ 27 and R. Vol. I, p.
205.)
- 10

3.

Attempts At Resolution.

r.

Dr. Olsson and Ms. Hatheway were scheduled to meet to discuss the PDP

30 days after Dr. Olsson gave Ms. Hatheway the document. Three meetings were planned to
occur on April 2, April 30, and May 28, 2007. However, in early April, Dr. Olsson was notified
by U of I's Ombudsperson, Roxanne Schreiber, that he needed to attend a series of sessions to
address Ms. Hatheway'S grievances. After the final meeting with the Ombudsperson and Ms.
Hatheway that took place on April 25, 2007, Ms. Hatheway and Dr. Olsson left the session and
rode the elevator back to their floor. They had a conversation agreeing that the meeting had been
productive. Ms. Hatheway did say however, that they still had work to do, and Dr. Olsson agreed
with her on that point. In that meeting, they discussed Dr. Olsson's work style, which is collegial,
but task oriented and not chit-chatty. Dr. Olsson thought that Ms. Hatheway, in this conversation,
began to recognize and appreciate the differences between his approach to work and hers, which
were simply different styles. Dr. Olsson also thought they were on the road to improvement. CR.
Vol. I, pp. 158 - 159, ~ 28.)
s.

On May 11,2007, Dr. Olsson learned from Academic Vice President Paul

Michaud CAVP Michaud) that Ms. Hatheway had filed grievances against him concerning: 1)
compensation, 2) communication, 3) confidentiality, 4) age discrimination, and 5) retaliation, and
that he would be conducting a problem solving session. This session occurred on May 18, 2007,
as planned. AVP Michaud explained that the last two issues in Ms. Hatheway'S grievance could
not be appropriately discussed in that setting, but would have to be taken to U of I's Human Rights
Office. They did discuss the other three issues. In the meeting, Ms. Hatheway stated that she
thought that the salary offered to Ms. Allen was unfair. On June 1,2007, Dr. Olsson provided a
-11

written response to Ms. Hatheway addressing her salary concerns and urging her to move forward
with meeting the goals of the PDP, which he believed would help resolve the communication
Issue. CR. Vol. I, p. 159,
t.

~

29.)

On August 29, 2007, Ms. Hatheway filed a complaint with the Idaho

Human Rights Commission (IHRC) claiming that Dr. Olsson gave Ms. Hatheway a poor
performance evaluation because of her age, then harassed her and retaliated against her when she
complained about discrimination. That investigation resulted in a finding of no probable cause by
the IHRC, which issued its decision on July 25, 2008. Ms. Hatheway tendered her resignation
from U ofI on August 28, 2008. CR. Vol. I, pp. 159

160, ~~ 30 and 31.)

4.

Facts Surrounding Ms. Hatheway's Age Discrimination Claims.

u.

Ms. Hatheway claims that her Performance Evaluation for 2006 was a

result of discrimination. Instead, the evaluation was based on Ms. Hatheway's job performance
for 2006. She did not mention discrimination until the meeting to discuss her written evaluation
on March 7, 2007. Ms. Hatheway's age was never a factor in any of Dr. Olsson's evaluations or
his employment relationship with Ms. Hatheway. In fact, they are close in age. The reasons for
Ms. Hatheway's evaluation are stated in the Performance Evaluation itself. There are no other
reasons. Dr. Olsson recognizes that Ms. Hatheway had good evaluations from 2002 to 2005.
However, the Performance Evaluation in question was for her performance in 2006. CR. Vol. I, p.
160, ~ 32 and R. Vol. I, pp. 197
v.

201.)

Dr. Olsson did not conduct Ms. Hatheway's annual evaluation for the year

2007. Ms. Hatheway's IHRC complaint had been filed and was pending. Dr. Olsson did not
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believe it would be fair, under those circumstances, to be the evaluator, as Ms. Hatheway had
already made claims of discrimination against him. (R. Vol. I, p. 160, ~ 33.)
w.

Ms. Hatheway claims that Dr. Olsson did not communicate with her and left

her "out of the loop." While his work style may be different from Ms. Hatheway's, he does not
avoid exchanging pleasantries. In the course of the day, Dr. Olsson focused on his duties and
often had work to do in his office. It is true that he did not linger and have conversations with Ms.
Hatheway, or any other staff person, but that has less to do with Ms. Hatheway than with the
demands of his job. (R. Vol. I, pp. 160
x.

161, ~ 34.)

As part of her claim of age discrimination, Ms. Hatheway has brought up a

faculty meeting that took place on October 4, 2006, in which there was discussion about Professor
Robert Wrigley (Prof. Wrigley) stepping down from the position of director of the Masters of Fine
Arts (MFA) Program, and that a decision had been made to create a new coordinator position to
take over Prof. Wrigley's prior administrative duties. It should be noted that Ms. Hatheway did
not attend this meeting, nor was she qualified to fill the position, which required a teaching degree.
(R. Vol. I, pp. 150

164; and R. Vol. I, p. 113, Depo of Lillian Hatheway, p. 86, II. 11-19.) A

recent MFA graduate named Pamela Yenser (Ms. Yenser) attended this meeting. Ms. Yenser has
testified that Dr. Olsson stated he was looking for someone "young" and "energetic" and that Ms.
Yenser would not be qualified. Dr. Olsson denies making such a statement and he denies that any
such qualifications or criteria were ever implied during that discussion. Dr. Olsson also denies
making any similar age-based comment to Ms. Hatheway concerning the MFA Coordinator
position. (R. Vol. I, pp. 160 - 161,

~

35.) The minutes do not reflect that Dr. Olsson made such a

statement. (R. Vol. I, p. 213 - 214.) Other faculty members who attended the October 4,2006,
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faculty meeting do not recall such a statement being made. CR. Vol. I, p. 149, Depo of Mary Ann
Judge, p. 32, 11. 8-12; R. Vol. I, p. 125, Depo of Gordon Thomas, p. 31,11. 5-23; R. Vol. I, p. 140,
Depo of Ronald McFarland, p. 31, 11. 6-19; R. Vol. I, p. 122, Depo ofJeffrey Jones, p. 28,11. 3-24;
R. Vol. I, p. 134, Depo of Steve Chandler, p. 33, 11. 21-25; and R. Vol. I, pp. 129 - 130, Depo of
Gary Williams, p. 65, 1. 24
y.

p. 67, 1. 4.)

Ms. Hatheway claims that a statement made by former U of I President

White establishes some environment of age discrimination.

As Dr. Olsson testified in his

deposition, he never attended any of President White's state of the university addresses, and has no
recollection of their contents or discussing any of them with any other U of I employee. Dr.
Olsson did see an exhibit in Ms. Hatheway's Human Rights Commission complaint consisting of a
transcript of a speech of former President White. However, that is all he is aware of concerning
that matter. CR. Vol. I, pp. 162 - 163, ~ 38.)
z.

Ms. Hatheway claims that Dr. Olsson took away duties and tasks from her

and did not provide a reason for reassigning her duties. In fact, he never revised Ms. Hatheway's
position description. Nor was Ms. Hatheway ever demoted. Occasionally, to accomplish their
job as a department, they have to shift tasks to address what needs doing now and who is available
to do it. Dr. Olsson sometimes performed clerical tasks. There were overlapping tasks between
Ms. Hatheway's and Ms. Allen's positions. CR. Vol. I, p. 101, ~ 9.) Some of the duties related to
alumni donations to the Department may have lessened over time for Ms. Hatheway, because that
function began to be computerized by the central office. CR. Vol. I, p. 163,
aa.

~

39.)

The behavior of Ms. Hatheway that led to Dr. Olsson's concerns and her

resulting performance evaluation was not just witnessed by Dr. Olsson and Ms. Allen.
- t4

For

example, Professor Robert Wrigley recalls two occasions in which Ms. Hatheway came to him,
complaining that she felt as though she had not been treated fairly in the hiring process. He found
the tone of Ms. Hatheway's complaints very disturbing. He found the behavior unprofessional
because he was not in any position to do anything about it and he was not the appropriate person to
complain to. The complaints did not seem legitimate to him. It was disturbing for him to hear,
and he viewed it as a disturbing kind of behavior. He felt like he was somehow being involved in
a kind of a conspiracy that didn't exist. CR. Vol. I, p. 117, Depo of Robert Wrigley, p. 26, 1. 6 - p.
27, 1. 22.) Professor Wrigley believes that the communications he had with Ms. Hatheway
negatively impacted the Department's ability to engage as a cohesive and supportive team. He
described Ms. Hatheway's behavior as, "rage or dissatisfaction, making it uncomfortable to be in
the office and to go down to the English office." CR. Vol. I, p. 118, !d., p. 54, ll. 2-25.)
bb.

There are a number of elderly members of the English Department. Many

faculty members in this case testified that they had never witnessed any incident which they would
consider as age discrimination during their terms of employment with U of 1. For example,
Robert Wrigley, who's date of birth is

, has never had a time or an occasion that

he witnessed where he believes U of I or its agents or employees treated someone differently
because of their age. (R. Vol. I, pp. 116 and 119, Depo ofRobert Wrigley, p. 6, 11. 21-24 and p. 62,
11. 4-10.) Professor Steve Chandler was born on

. He has been at U ofl for over 30

years. In his time at U of I, Professor Chandler has observed that age is not a factor in how older
individuals are treated. They are treated as anybody else would be -- on their job performance.
Professor Chandler has no reason to believe that Dr. Olsson discriminated against Ms. Hatheway
based on her age. CR. Vol. I, pp. 133 and 135 - 136, Depo ofSteve Chandler, p. 6, 11. 13-14; and R.
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Vol. I, pp. 135

136, p. 45, 1. 20 - p. 50,1. 12.) Professor Ron McFarland was born on

, and has been an English Professor at U of! for over 34 years. (R. Vol. I, p. 139, Depo of

Ronald McFarland, p. 6, 1. 6

p. 8, 1. 21.) Professor McFarland has never observed any instance

at U of I of what he believed to be age discrimination. He has not observed anyone over the age of
40 being discriminated against in the English Department. (R. Vol. I, p. 141, Id., p. 46, 1. 12 - p.
48, 1. 4.) Professor Mary Blew was born on

. She was hired by U of! in 1994

(age 55). When her deposition was taken on June 23, 2010, Professor Blew was over 70 years
old. She has no recollection of any time where she thought or believed that any U of I employee
was being treated differently because of age. (R. Vol. I, p. 144 - 146, Depo of Mary Blew, p. 6, 1.
21

p. 9, 1. 13; and p. 29, 1. 21 - p. 30,1. 5.) Professor Gary Williams was born on

(R. Vol. I, p. 128, Depo of Gary Williams, p. 7,1. 5

.

I. 9.) He has never in his own experience

witnessed or perceived anybody at U of! ever being treated differently because of their age. (Id.,
R. Vol. I, p. 130, !d., p. 68, 11. 16-20.)
D.

Standard of Review

This Court's review of a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is the
same as that required of the district court when ruling on the motion. Friel v. Boise City Housing

Authority, 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29,30 (1994). If the evidence reveals no disputed issues
of material fact, what remains is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.

Id., citing Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367
(1994).
Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
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that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P.56(c). The movant
has the burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch.

Dist. No. 25, 149 Idaho 679, 683, 239 P.3d 784, 788 (2010). Disputed facts and reasonable
inferences are construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Castorena v. Gen. Elec., 149 Idaho
609,613,238 P.3d 209, 213 (2010).
When a motion for summary judgment is "supported by a particularized affidavit, the
opposing party may not rest upon bare allegations or denials in his pleadings," but must set forth
"specific facts" showing a genuine issue. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Verbillis v. Dependable Appliance Co.,
107 Idaho 335, 337, 689 P.2d 227, 229 (Ct. App. 1984). A "mere scintilla" of evidence or only a
"slight doubt" as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark

Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986), citing Snake River Equip. Co. v.
Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 691 P .2d 787 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Jenkins v. Boise Cascade
Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 238, 108 P.3d 380,385 (2005). Finally, the initial burden of establishing
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party, and once this burden is met,
it is incumbent upon the non-moving party to establish an issue of fact regarding that element.

Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,923 P.2d 416 (1996).
Additionally, in employment discrimination cases, the plaintiffs burden is not high at the
summary judgment stage. Plaintiff "must only show that a rational trier of fact could, on all the
evidence, find that [the defendant's] explanation was pretextual and that, therefore, its action was
taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons." Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 746
(9th Cir. 2003). However, "when evidence to refute the defendant's legitimate explanation is
totally lacking, summary judgment is appropriate even though plaintiff may have established a
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minimal prima facie case based on a McDonnell Douglas type presumption."

Wallis v. JR.

Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890-891 (9th Cir. 1994).

II.
A.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's claims

under the IHRA, including age discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation and
constructive discharge?
B.

Did the district court err

III

granting summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's

emotional distress claim?

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

Ms. Hatheway's Age Discrimination and Constructive Discharge Claims Fail
as a Matter of Law.

The first section of the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA) declares that its purpose is to
"provide for the execution within the state of the policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act
of 1964, ... and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ... " (ADEA) Idaho Code §
67 -5901. This Court has previously determined that the legislative intent reflected in Idaho Code
§ 67-5901 allows Idaho's state courts to look to federal law for guidance in the interpretation ofthe

state provisions. Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. ofIdaho , 123 Idaho 650, 653,851 P.2d
946 (1993); O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796,811,810 P.2d 1082, 1097 (1991). Ms. Hatheway's
age discrimination related claims under the Idaho Human Rights Act should, therefore, be
considered in light of the ADEA and related case law.
This Court addressed the elements for an ADEA claim in Waterman v. Nationwide Mut.

Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 667, 201 P.3d 640 (2009).
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Just as in Waterman, to establish an age

discrimination claim for the purposes of this case, Ms. Hatheway must first demonstrate that she
was a member of a protected class, which here is an employee at least 40 years of age. 29 U.S.C.
§ 631(a); Wallis v. JR. Simp/at Co., 26 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Idaho Code §
67-5909.

Second, Ms. Hatheway must demonstrate that she was performing her job in a

satisfactory manner. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004); Wallis,
26 F.3d at 891. Third, Ms. Hatheway must demonstrate that she was discharged or her employer
took adverse employment action against her. Id. Fourth, Ms. Hatheway must demonstrate that
her position was filled by a younger person of equal or lesser qualifications.

Wallis, 26 F.3d at

891. In Waterman, supra, the third element of his ADEA claim was dispositive, so the Court did
not address elements one, two or four.
is also dispositive.

146 Idaho at 672. This element of Ms. Hatheway's claim

Ms. Hatheway was not discharged, nor did her employer take adverse

employment action against her based upon her age.
In Waterman, the Court set forth the standard for an age discrimination and constructive
discharge claim, which also controls in this case:
To establish the third element of Appellant's ADEA claim, he must
prove he was discharged or Respondent took adverse employment action
against him. In this case, Appellant contends he was constructively
discharged. "Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee's
reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is
assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes. The inquiry is
objective: Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable
person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign?"
Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Penn.
State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 2351 (2004)).
Under the adverse employment action doctrine, the United States Supreme
Court has stated, "A tangible employment action constitutes a significant
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
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Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257,2268 (1998) (comparing Crady
v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F .2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)
("A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of
employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less
distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished
material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a
particular situation"), with Flaherty v. Gas Research Institute, 31 F.3d 451,
456 (7th Cir. 1994) (a "bruised ego" is not enough), Kocsis v. Multi-Care
Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 887 (6th Cir. 1996) (demotion without
change in pay, benefits, duties, or prestige insufficient), and Harlston v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379,382 (8th Cir. 1994) (reassignment
to more inconvenient job insufficient)).
146 Idaho at 672-673.
The Waterman Court also addressed the existing standards for evaluating claims like Ms.
Hatheway'S alleging disparate treatment based upon age:
When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment by an employer in an
ADEA case, "liability depends on whether the protected trait (under the
ADEA, age) actually motivated the employer's decision." Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097,
2105 (2000) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113
S.Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993)). Whatever the employer's decision making
process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's
protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative
influence on the outcome. Id. Stray remarks are insufficient to establish
discrimination. Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993)
(citing Merrick v. Farmer's Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.
1990)).
146 Idaho at 673.
Several months after the Waterman decision, the United States Supreme Court provided
additional guidance on a plaintiffs burden of proof in an ADEA claim in Gross v. FBL Financial

Services, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2343 (2009). According to Gross, plaintiffs pursuing claims of age
discrimination under the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the
"but-for" cause of the challenged adverse employment action. The burden of persuasion does
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not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when
a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision. 129
S.Ct. at 2345. The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that the proper interpretation of the
ADEA is controlled by the standard established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775,
for cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when an employee alleges that he
suffered an adverse employment action because of both permissible and impermissible
considerations

i.e., a "mixed motives" case. !d. at 2346. Therefore, the burden of proof never

shifts to the employer in an ADEA claim. As noted by the Supreme Court:
The ADEA's text does not authorize an alleged mixed-motives age
discrimination claim. The ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement
that an employer took adverse action "because of' age is that age was the
"reason" that the employer decided to act. See Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610,113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338. To establish
a disparate-treatment claim under this plain language, a plaintiff must prove
that age was the "but-for" cause of the employer's adverse decision. See
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co, 553 U.S. 639, ----, 128 S.Ct. 2131,
170 L.Ed.2d 1012. It follows that under § 623(a)(1), the plaintiff retains
the burden of persuasion to establish that "but-for" case. This Court has
previously held this to be the burden's proper allocation in ADEA cases,
see, e.g., Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135, ---- - ----,
---- - ----, 128 S.Ct. 2361,171 L.Ed.2d 322, and nothing in the statute's text
indicates that Congress has carved out an exception for a subset of ADEA
cases. Where a statute is *2346 "silent on the allocation of the burden of
persuasion," "the ordinary default rule [is] that plaintiffs bear the risk of
failing to prove their claims." Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49,56, 126 S.Ct.
528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387. Hence, the burden of persuasion is the same in
alleged mixed-motives cases as in any other ADEA disparate-treatment
action. Pp. 2350 2351.
129 S.Ct. at 2345 - 2346.
The applicable statutory language of the Idaho Human Rights Act dictates the same result.
According to Idaho Code § 67-5909, it is a prohibited act to discriminate against a person
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"because of, or on the basis of, age ... " As provided in Waterman, supra, Ms. Hatheway bears
the burden of proving that her age actually played a role in U of I's decision-making process and
had a determinative influence on the outcome.

146 Idaho at 673. Moreover, as shown by the

holding of Gross, and the plain language of Idaho Code § 67-5909, Ms. Hatheway must show that
U of I discriminated against her "because of, or on the basis of," her age.

The burden of

persuasion does not shift to U of I to prove otherwise.
1.

The Salary Differences Between Ms. Hatheway and Ms. Allen Do Not
Support a Claim of Age Discrimination.

Ms. Hatheway makes no claim of age discrimination toward her at U of I from 1999 to
2005, the first six years of her employment. Ms. Hatheway was in her sixties during most of that
time. With a date of birth of

, Ms. Hatheway would have been hired at the

approximate age of 57.
It was only when Ms. Allen came to the English Department as a Financial Technician that

problems arose and for which Ms. Hatheway now claims age discrimination. Ms. Hatheway
admits that she was unhappy that Ms. Allen received a salary that was higher than posted in the job
announcement. (R. Vol., I, pp. 111-112) She points to no internal rule or regulation of U of I
that would have required Ms. Hatheway to receive the same salary. Ms. Hatheway'S and Ms.
Allen's jobs were different and served different functions within the Department. Dr. Olsson
included Ms. Hatheway in the search committee to fill this position and Ms. Hatheway supported
the hiring of Ms. Allen. (R. Vol. I, p. 111)
It was explained to Ms. Hatheway that Ms. Allen's salary was based upon her knowledge

and experience, market forces and the Department's needs. Ms. Allen was performing a different

- 22

job than Ms. Hatheway. Ms. Allen was willing to take the position at a salary commensurate with
what she had been making in her prior, non-supervisory position at U of I. (R. Vol. I, pp. 152 153, ~ 10; R. Vol. I, pp. 97 -102; R. Vol. I, pp. 217 - 218, ~~ 7-8.)
For some reason, Ms. Hatheway believes that she, as an administrative assistant, should be
able to dictate the salary of another U of I employee who has different job duties, different
experience and different credentials. Ms. Hatheway argues that Ms. Allen's position was "in the
same pay grade" and that Ms. Hatheway had more "Hay points" and a longer tenure with U of I.
(See, R. Vol. I, p. 70.)

Without submitting any admissible proof, Ms. Hatheway offers the

opinion that somehow U of I was obligated to pay Ms. Hatheway at least as much or more than Ms.
Allen. Ms. Hatheway is incorrect. As Dr. Olsson explained in his letter to Ms. Hatheway of
June 1,2007, Ms. Allen came to the English Department at a lateral salary of$14.70 per hour
what she was earning in Sponsored Programs before she became a supervisor:
That she should have come to the Department at the salary rate she
did was a function of her previous salary, market forces, and our
needs; as I explained two weeks ago, we must always weigh those
issues in making hires if we are to move forward as a Department.
I should also note something I've recently learned, that Hay Points
only allow the Institution to place a position in a given pay grade;
they are not designed or intended to address equity issues within a
grade.
(R. Vol. I, pp. 206 - 207.)
Not only is Ms. Hatheway incorrect in implying that U of! somehow had a duty to pay Ms.
Allen less (or Ms. Hatheway more), she presents not one scintilla of evidence that the pay
difference for these two positions was in any way based upon Ms. Hatheway's age. To conclude
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otherwise would require a reasonable person to conclude that U of! decided to pay Ms. Allen more
so that it could intentionally discriminate against Ms. Hatheway when Ms. Allen was hired.
Nevertheless, this did not prevent Ms. Hatheway from expressing anger toward Dr. Olsson
and developing a poor attitude with resentment and a willingness to make disparaging remarks to
other employees. For example, Ms. Hatheway vented to Professor Robert Wrigley on at least two
occasions, complaining about the hiring process. Professor Wrigley had a "great fondness" for
Ms. Hatheway but found her comments as "highly unprofessional" and as far as he knew the
situation was "without basis." He referred to it as a "conspiracy that didn't exist." He believes
that the communications he had with Ms. Hatheway negatively impacted the Department's ability
to engage as a cohesive and supportive team. (See, R. Vol. I, p. 79.)
Ms. Hatheway claims that she asked the Dean, Ms. Katherine Aiken, whether the pay
differential between her and Ms. Allen was "because of age?" She further claims that in response
to that question, Dean Aiken got "very furious" with Ms. Hatheway, and that "Dr. Olsson and the
University denied any age discrimination in Dr. Olsson's decision to offer and give Ms. Allen a
higher rate of pay than Ms. Hatheway." (See, R. Vol. II, p. 248.) Assuming, without conceding
that Dean Aiken got "very furious," evidently if someone vehemently denies something (such as
age discrimination), Ms. Hatheway believes that it should be viewed as an admission. U of I asks
this Court to reject such illogical reasoning.
Moreover, Ms. Hatheway has failed to present any evidence that other U of I employees
with her same Administrative Assistant II job title were treated more favorably than her in terms
of compensation.

Ms. Hatheway provides no statistical analysis, much less evidence of a

statistical pattern that U of I's hiring decisions adversely affected older employees. See Rose v.
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Wells Fargo, 902 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir. 1990) (statistics must show "stark pattern of
discrimination unexplainable on grounds other than age"); see also Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994
F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993).
Finally, what is curious about this part of Ms. Hatheway's claim is that Ms. Allen herself
was 47 years old at the time she was hired. If U of I had an impermissible policy of hiring
younger workers, it certainly was not shown in the hiring of Ms. Allen as a Financial Technician
in the English Department. Ms. Hatheway has no evidence that the salary decision for Ms. Allen
had anything to do with Ms. Hatheway'S age.
2.

The Alleged "Ageist Comments" Cited by Ms. Hatheway Do Not
Show That Ms. Hatheway Was Discriminated Against, Based Upon
Her Age.

As part of her evidence, Ms. Hatheway cites so-called "ageist" comments from two
sources. First, Ms. Hatheway cites to a May 1,2006, "State of the University" address by former
U of I President, Timothy P. White, the contents of which apparently included reference to the
need of some of the staff at the schools to seriously consider retirement and to help U of I recruit
young, entry level or mid-career persons. (R. Vol. I, p. 15, ~ 2.8.) But, as noted by Dr. Olsson
in his deposition and his Affidavit, he never attended any of President White's State of the
University addresses and he has no recollection of their contents or discussing any of them with
any other U of I employee. Moreover, Ms. Hatheway was not the only employee at U of I within
the English Department who was in her sixties. Dr. Olsson himself is of similar age and many
other faculty members serving in the Department at the same time as Ms. Hatheway are what one
could call elderly; including Professors Wrigley, Chandler, McFarland, Blew and Williams.
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(See the deposition testimony excerpts of the faculty members set forth in the Statement of Facts,
pp. 15-16, supra.)
The other "ageist" comments cited by Ms. Hatheway allegedly took place at a faculty
meeting in October, 2006, in which there was discussion about creating a new coordinator
position for the Masters of Fine Arts program. Dr. Olsson is alleged to have stated that he was
looking for someone "young" and "energetic" to fill the position, and he's alleged to have told
Pamela Yenser, an older individual, that she would not be qualified for the position. Dr. Olsson
denies having made these statements and the meeting minutes do not indicate that any such
comments were made. Moreover, Ms. Hatheway fails to show how any such comments could
logically relate to her position as an Administrative Assistant at all. Ms. Hatheway was not at the
meeting and was not even qualified to apply for the position. Ms. Hatheway did not possess
even the basic entry level qualifications for that position, which required an advanced degree in
English or writing, and college teaching experience. (R. Vol. I, pp. 161 - 162, ~ 35.)2
The alleged "ageist" comments do not support an inference of discrimination because,
even if they were true (which U of I disputes), they were not related to Ms. Hatheway'S
employment. There is no evidence that any such stray comments, susceptible to a variety of
interpretations, are remotely related to Ms. Hatheway'S eventual departure from U of I. The law
is clear that "stray" remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination. Waterman, supra, 146
Idaho at 673. Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434,1438-1439 (9th Cir. 1990).

2 In a puzzling development, Ms. Hatheway actually applied for the MFA Coordinator position. She had to have
known that she did not meet the qualifications for the job. (Jd.) One can only wonder why Ms. Hatheway would
apply for a position for which she was clearly unqualified, unless she was attempting to bolster her age discrimination
claim.
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In Merrick, the plaintiff sued his employer because the employer promoted a younger
worker instead of him. The supervisor that promoted the younger worker commented that he
chose him because he was "a bright, intelligent, knowledgeable young man." The plaintiff
argued this comment was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. The court disagreed, finding
that the supervisor's alleged comment was a "stray remark."

Id. at 1439.

See also Price

Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989); Gagne v.
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 314-16 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that a "single, isolated
discriminatory comment" by plaintiffs immediate supervisor was insufficient to trigger a burden
shift or to avoid summary judgment for defendant); Smith v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 875
F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that stray "remarks, ... when unrelated to the decisional
process, are insufficient to demonstrate that the employer relied on illegitimate criteria, even
when such statements are made by the decisionmaker in issue"); Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d
703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that employer's use of the phrase "[w]e don't necessarily like
grey hair" did not support an inference of discriminatory motive, as the comment was uttered in
an ambivalent manner and was not tied directly to plaintiffs termination).
B.

Ms. Hatheway's Hostile Work Environment Claims Fail as a Matter of Law.
[T]o establish a primafacie hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff
must raise a triable issue of fact as to whether her "workplace [was]
permeated with discriminatory intimidation ... that [was] sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and
create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
510 U.S. 17,21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); Brooks v. City of San Mateo,
229 F.2d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000). The working environment must
both subjectively and objectively be perceived as abusive. Fuller v.
city of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Unlike a Title VII claim that is based on discrete acts of discrimination,
a hostile work environment claim is based upon the cumulative effect of
individual acts that may not themselves be actionable. Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115-16, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153
L.Ed.2d 106 (2002).
In determining whether a hostile work
environment claim exists that is actionable, the court looks to all the
circumstances, including: frequency of discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or merely
an offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance. Id.

Jamal v. Wilshire Management Leasing Corp., 320 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1081 (D.Or. 2004).
Ms. Hatheway claims that Dr. Olsson's attitude became cold and negative, that he kept his
office door shut, avoiding communication and failing to follow up on required meetings. She
claims that her work space was changed without her knowledge. She also claims that she had
several primary job duties and responsibilities taken away from her. (R. Vol. I, p. 16,

~

2.9.)

Ms. Hatheway makes these allegations to support her claim of a hostile work environment,
retaliation, and ultimately, constructive discharge.
U of I does not accept Ms. Hatheway's description of the workplace environment or
claims of retaliation. Moreover, Ms. Hatheway fails to relate her discomfort to any age based
discrimination or adverse employment action. See Flannery v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160
F.3d 425, 428 (8th Cir. 1998) (shunning is not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff
did not show that the ostracism resulted in a reduced salary, benefits, seniority, or
responsibilities); "While adverse employment actions extend beyond readily quantifiable losses,
not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action. Otherwise,
minor and even trivial employment actions that an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did
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not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit." Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437,
441 (7th Cir. 1996).
Moreover, as shown by the Affidavits of Dr. Olsson and Deborah Allen, Ms. Hatheway's
duties did at times overlap with Ms. Allen's. Her job description was never modified. She was
not demoted. Some of Ms. Hatheway's duties related to alumni donations to the Department
may have lessened over time for Ms. Hatheway, because that function began to be computerized
by the central office. (R. Vol. I, p. 163,

~

39.)

As noted in the Statement of Facts herein, many of the Professors serving in the English
Department at the same time as Ms. Hatheway are what could be described as elderly, including
Dr. Olsson, and Professors Wrigley, Chandler, McFarland, Blew and Williams. Moreover, the
Professors identified herein all testified at their depositions that they have not experienced or
witnessed U of I treating someone differently because of their age.
Ms. Hatheway claims that she was forced to resign due to the alleged age-based hostile
work environment at U of 1. 3 (R. Vol. I, pp. 24

25, ~~ 5.1-5.7.) As noted by the Idaho

Supreme Court, the question that must be answered is: "Did working conditions become so
intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to
resign?"

146 Idaho at 672.

Ms. Hatheway's claims of constructive discharge fail for two

important reasons. First, working conditions that she described were not so intolerable that a
reasonable person in her position would have felt compelled to resign. As in Waterman, Ms.

3 Ms. Hatheway gave two weeks' notice of her resignation/retirement. As shown by the Supplemental Affidavit of
Dr. Olsson, the Department was required to act quickly to find a replacement and worked through Dean Aiken and the
Human Resources coordinator to fill the position. (R. Vol. I, pp. 218-219) Ms. Hatheway was 66 at the time. U of
I did not engage in a cynical attempt to blunt Ms. Hatheway's baseless age discrimination claim by attempting to hire
someone of Ms. Hatheway's age as her replacement.
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Hatheway was an unhappy employee. As such, "not every unhappy employee has an actionable
claim of constructive discharge."

Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 552 (lOth Cir. 1994).

Secondly, as in Waterman, Ms. Hatheway has failed to establish a nexus between the alleged
adverse employment actions of which she complains and any evidence that age discrimination
was a motivating factor.
C.

146 Idaho at 673.

Ms. Hatheway'S Claims of Unlawful Retaliation Fail as a Matter of Law.

In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Ms. Hatheway must show: (l) that
she participated in a protected activity, (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3)
that there was a causal connection between her engaging in the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Kessler v. Westchester County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 205-06
(2d Cir. 2006). Ms. Hatheway contends the protected activity she engaged in was her filing of a
problem solving request with U ofI, notifying U of I's human rights compliance officer regarding
her perceived age discrimination, and her filing of an age discrimination claim with the Idaho
Human Rights Commission. Ms. Hatheway then contends she suffered adverse employment
actions when, as a result of her lawful activities, she was given two poor performance evaluations
along with a performance development plan, suffered the loss of automatic wage increases due to
the poor performance evaluations, had job duties taken away from her, and was subjected to
silence and a hostile work environment.
U of I agrees that Ms. Hatheway received laudatory performance evaluations in previous
years.

She earned them and deserved them.

However, she also earned and deserved the

performance evaluations she received in 2006 and 2007. Ms. Hatheway'S resentment over Ms.
Allen's salary affected her attitude and behavior. Dr. Olsson indicated in the 2006 performance
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evaluation in several places that Ms. Hatheway "needs improvement."

Simply because an

employee disagrees with an evaluation does not mean that he or she is being discriminated against
based on age. The undisputed facts show that by January 2007, Ms. Allen had reached the point
when she felt it best to resign. Her interactions with Ms. Hatheway had become very difficult to
tolerate. (R. Vol. I, p. 100,

~

7.) Fortunately, Ms. Allen withdrew her resignation, much to the

delight of many department members and the displeasure of Ms. Hatheway. On February 7,
2007, Ms. Hatheway again went out of her way to voice her displeasure to one ofthe senior faculty
members in the department, Douglas Adams, and she complained about Ms. Allen and Dr. Olsson.
(R. Vol. I, p. 156,

~

21, R. Vol. I, p. 196.)

In preparing the 2006 performance evaluation, Dr. Olsson first consulted with the Human
Resources Department at U of I. In the evaluation, he noted Ms. Hatheway's need to improve in
some areas, including civility, communication and teamwork.

Based upon consultation with

Human Resources, Dr. Olsson also decided to use a Performance Development Plan (PDP) to
assist Ms. Hatheway in improving as an employee. CR. Vol. I, pp. 156 - 158, ~~ 22-27.)
Ms. Hatheway continues to insist that these were somehow disciplinary measures. (See,
Appellant's Brief, p. 46.) Yet, at the same time, she continues to ignore the communication that
was provided to her by the Director of Human Resources, April Preston, on July 24,2007, advising
her that "Performance Development Plans are intended to be pro-active and supportive documents
for the employee. They are not disciplinary in any way." (R. Vol. I, p. 205.) "The use ofa PDP
illustrates a commitment on the part of the supervisor to help the employee be successful." Id.
In keeping with her negative attitude, Ms. Hatheway refused to sign either the employee
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evaluation or PDP. Ignoring the evidence of her own behavior, Ms. Hatheway instead argues that
her less than positive evaluation must be evidence of age discrimination.
Dr. Olsson did not conduct Ms. Hatheway's annual evaluation for the year 2007. Ms.
Hatheway's IHRC complaint had been filed and was pending. Dr. Olsson did not believe it would
be fair, under those circumstances, to be the evaluator.

The evaluation was conducted by

Associate Dean of the College of Letters, Arts and Social Sciences, Ms. Debbie Storrs. (R. Vol.
III, p. 674.) And, even though out of 13 evaluation criteria, she received ten "meets requirements"
ratings, two "needs improvement" ratings and one "exceeds requirements," Ms. Hatheway
complains that this evaluation is somehow also evidence of age discrimination. On one hand, Ms.
Hatheway complains that this performance evaluation prevented her from receiving an automatic
pay raise.

On the other hand, she acknowledges that after making "another complaint," she

received a letter notifying her that she was receiving a $.38 per hour pay raise. (R. Vol. III, pp.
674-675.) Again, Ms. Hatheway fails to show that this evaluation was in any way related to her
age.
As noted by the district court, the chronology of Ms. Hatheway'S interaction with U of I
concerning her complaints does not support her claim of retaliation:
Ms. Hatheway filed her Problem Solving Request Form with the
University on April 30, 2007; she met with the University's human
rights compliance officer on May 30, 2007, and she filed her complaint
with the Idaho Human Rights Commission on August 29,2007. After
Ms. Hatheway had engaged in the listed activities, she received a
performance evaluation that included only two "needs improvement"
ratings, a significant decrease from the thirteen "needs improvement"
ratings she received prior to her engaging in the listed activities. In
addition, in 2008 Ms. Hatheway received a 3% wage increase. The
evidence simply does not support Ms. Hatheway's claim of retaliation.
While her perception that Dr. Olsson avoided communicating with her
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and that her job responsibilities had changed to some degree may be
accurate, there is no evidence that the University retaliated against her
because she engaged in protected activities.
(R. Vol. III, p. 685.)

D.

Ms. Hatheway's Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim Fails as a
Matter of Law.

As in any other negligence claim, a plaintiff seeking to prove a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress must prove: (l) duty; (2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages.

Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 466,210 P.3d 563 (2009). Negligent infliction of emotional
distress is simply a category of the tort of negligence, requiring the elements of a common law
negligence action. Id.
Here, the duty Ms. Hatheway would impose upon U of I relates to the age discrimination
prohibition of the IHRA. As noted above, Ms. Hatheway's age discrimination claims fail as a
matter of law. Therefore, U of I breached no duty to Ms. Hatheway upon which a negligence
claim could be based. Because Ms. Hatheway has failed to show a material issue of fact on her
age discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation and constructive discharge claims, any
emotional distress claim must also fail.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, U ofI respectfully requests this Court to affirm the Decision and
Judgment of the district court.
//
//
//
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DATED

thi~ay of July, 2012.
LLP

PETER C. ERBLAND
Attorney for Defendants
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